Belisarius: The Last Roman General (32 page)

Failing to understand the reasons for the defeat, Witigis insulted the survivors and accused them of cowardice. Three days later, with 500 men gathered from all of the camps, Witigis again employed the identical ruse. The result was the same. This time, 1,500 of the
foederati
under Martinus and Valerian destroyed the Goths he had sent.

However, Procopius may not be telling the whole truth, either in order to magnify the abilities of Belisarius when compared to the (apparently inept) Witigis, or due to his inability to grasp the finer details of generalship. It is possible that Witigis was attempting to duplicate the ruse used by Belisarius, yet a close analysis of the text reveals the difficulties both he and Belisarius faced. It is too easily forgotten that the areas around the walls of the city would not have been open grassland. Instead, there would have been fields, vineyards, fences and all of the other obstacles presented by Roman farming techniques. In such restricted terrain, the bow would not have greatly outranged the javelin and, as a consequence, the attempt to replicate the ruse was not actually too farfetched.

Yet there was one factor in which Belisarius was superior to Witigis: his supply of excellent junior officers and the superior quality of the troops he used. Trajan, Mundilas and Oilas were all members of his personal bodyguard and men who could be trusted to translate his orders into action. Furthermore, on these operations Belisarius did not send out the regular cavalry of the army, using instead small numbers of his personal
comitatus; bucellarii
of proven ability and daring. These superior troops with excellent leaders fulfilled the task perfectly.

Witigis did not have such a luxury. His leaders and troops were not as highly trained and efficient as the bodyguards and
bucellarii
and so failed to follow the plan, allowing themselves to be surrounded and practically annihilated. Three days later, Witigis repeated the attempt, but again his troops were defeated with heavy loss.

Yet it may be that Witigis was not actually attempting to repeat the Byzantines’ tactic. It is possible that he was, at least in part, attempting to seize the initiative and deprive Belisarius of the terrain near to the walls from which to effect his hit-and-run tactics. By occupying the high ground outside the city walls from which the Byzantines had been launching their attacks, he may have been pre-empting their assaults and attempting to tighten the siege, whilst at the same time ensuring that army morale remained high. Whichever theory is correct, the strategy failed: The Goths were defeated and Belisarius retained the initiative, which was to be the undoing of the Goths.

Recognising their danger, the Goths now reverted to maintaining the siege: when Belisarius repeated his tactics, the Goths simply drove the Byzantine cavalry away by a controlled charge that did not leave them vulnerable to a counter attack or from missiles from the city walls.

The episode illustrates Belisarius’ ability as a general; it was a superb use of the strengths of his horse archers – mobility and firepower – against the weakness of cavalry that relied on hand-to-hand combat to defeat the enemy. On the other hand, Witigis’ attempt to use the stratagem demonstrates that, although he understood what was happening, he did not have the highly-trained manpower necessary to repeat Belisarius’ tactics for himself.

It was at about this time that Belisarius confided to his friends that he had always been confident of victory over the Goths. Like the Vandals, the Gothic cavalry had no answer to the Byzantine horse archers, being unable to close with the enemy and fight whilst still suffering casualties from a distance. Only if vastly outnumbered and threatened with encirclement would the Byzantines be in any danger of defeat by the Vandal horsemen. Although in theory the Gothic foot archers could be used to counter the threat, these were – understandably – too timid to face the Byzantine cavalry on their own, and so needed a covering force of heavy infantry to act as a screen. Unfortunately for the Goths, the heavily-armed men manoeuvred too slowly, allowing the Byzantine horsemen to move away from the threat of the archers.

The Battle of Rome

It was their very success in these skirmishes that was to be the undoing of the Byzantines. The troops began to put pressure on Belisarius as they now believed that they could beat the Goths in an open battle. At last he agreed, yet he wanted the battle to be fought on his terms. Therefore he continued with the stratagem of sallies as detailed above, hoping for an opportunity to lead the remainder of his men out and so take the Goths by surprise. The hope did not materialise; the Goths remained vigilant and were always ready for such a move.

Finally, Belisarius abandoned his hopes and gave orders for the troops to deploy for a more traditional, set-piece battle. He sent Valentinus and his men out of the Aurelian Gate on to the Plains of Nero. Their instructions were to harass and pin Marcian and his men in their camp, and not allow any reinforcements to cross the bridge to the east bank of the river. On no account were they to become engaged in a pitched battle.

Belisarius was also faced with the problem of what to do with the Romans. Many of them had volunteered and wanted to fight the Goths. As they were untrained and of dubious quality, they could easily be routed by an enemy attack. Belisarius therefore deployed them through the Pancratian Gate and had them form a dense formation close to the left bank of the river. In this way, these untried troops would help to pin down the Goths whilst not actually being in any danger. Only if Belisarius gave the signal were they to advance and attack the enemy. It was an ingenious way of solving a knotty problem, since any refusal to use them could lead to a drop in their morale with a subsequent refusal to fight in their own defence any longer.

On the east bank, Belisarius had a similar problem. Most of his infantrymen had by now acquired horses captured during the many sorties against the Goths. During the quiet periods of the siege they had been training as cavalrymen and Belisarius now decided that the main effort against the Goth should be fought entirely as a cavalry action. The remnants of the infantry that were without horses, composed of unmounted Isaurians, were to be drawn up near the moat to act as a rallying point behind which the cavalry could reform if they encountered any difficulties.However the morale of the army was high and the infantry were unhappy about being left with such a minor role. Two of Belisarius’ guardsmen, Principius and Tarmatus, argued that the poor showing of the infantry was due to the poor quality of their officers, who ran away as soon as danger threatened. It was not surprising that their men would follow suit. These officers were now mounted and were part of the cavalry arm. Principius and Tarmatus argued that if Belisarius allowed them to lead the infantry, the infantry would fight and not run away. Eventually Belisarius agreed. Leaving a small number of men to guard the gates, the rest of the infantry were deployed to the rear of the cavalry, where they could still act as a rallying point. Yet it was clear that Belisarius did not trust the infantry, since they were deployed in such a way that if they routed, they would not disrupt the ranks of the cavalry as they fled.

The Gothic army deployed in a very traditional manner. In the centre were the ‘heavy-armed men’, protecting the archers from attack by the Byzantine cavalry. The Gothic cavalry were split fairly evenly between the two flanks. Witigis did, however, order his troops to deploy as far away from the city as possible, lining his men up immediately before the camps. He believed that the sheer size of his army would lead to victory and he wanted the Byzantines to be as far away from the city as possible when they broke. In this way, his men would have more distance in which to pursue the Byzantines before they reached the cover of the walls, and this would enable them to cause the maximum number of casualties. Although Witigis was not of the same calibre as Belisarius, as was seen above in his attempt to emulate Byzantine tactics, it is clear that he did have a grasp of at least some of the basic elements of warfare.

The battle on the east side of the river began in the expected manner. With Belisarius and Witigis at the back urging their troops to perform great deeds, the Byzantines advanced to within missile range and began firing at the Goths. The Goths, however, did not act to remove the threat; they simply stood their ground, absorbing the casualties.

Obviously, the Byzantines were happy with this state of affairs, but slowly began to close the distance between the lines. Gradually, as the gap between the armies closed, the Byzantines began to grow tired and their supplies of ammunition began to dwindle. They were now close enough to charge the Goths, as is shown by Athenodorus of Belisarius’ guards, and Theodoriscus and George of Martinus’ guards, repeatedly charging at the Goths and killing many with their spears (Proc,
Wars,
V.xxviii.20–21). Yet as the fighting gradually became face-to-face, the Gothic archers also began to cause casualties in the Byzantine ranks, many of the horses being killed or wounded. The wounded and those unhorsed sought sanctuary in the city, reducing the troops at Belisarius’ immediate disposal.

The slow attrition of the Byzantine ranks did not go unnoticed. At last, the Goths reacted. Either spontaneously, as suggested by Procopius
(Wars,
V.xviii), or having received the order from Witigis, the cavalry on the Gothic right wing charged. The opposition fled back to the safety of the infantry line, expecting to use the cover of the infantry to regroup before returning to the battle. To no avail; the majority of the infantry wavered and broke, running for the safety of the city. The panic spread to the rest of the army and the entire Byzantine cavalry force routed, pursued for a short distance by the Goths.

The rout would have been a disaster if it had not been for the actions of a section of the infantry that stood their ground. The men around Principius and Tarmatus fought bravely, slowing the Gothic pursuit and allowing the Byzantines to reach the comparative safety of the moat. Eventually, Principius was overwhelmed and killed, along with forty-two of the Isaurians, whilst Tarmatus continued to fight until he was rescued by his brother Ennes and a detachment of reformed cavalry. Sadly, he was to die of his wounds two days later.

The fleeing Byzantines, covered by this gallant rearguard, reached the city, only to be denied entry by the citizens, who were massed on the wall to watch the battle. Frustrated, they gathered between the walls and the moat. The situation could have resulted in disaster, but the Goths, seeing a large number of people upon the walls, decided not to close with the Byzantines, instead returning victorious to their camps. The battle east of the river was over.